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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HARRY MAE ST AS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 13751 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This Is a criminal action charging appellant with 
the offense of murder. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict of 
guilty to the charge of murder in the second degree, the 
defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment, and to 
be granted a new trial. The specific relief sought is 
release from the Utah State Prison pending retrial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was charged with first degree murder for 
the shooting of Rosemary Matteucci on December 31, 1973. 
A jury was selected and impaneled to try the facts 
of the case on June 20, 1974. This jury included one Vern 
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D. Carpenter, who occupied seat number 12 in the jury box. 
After the jury was impaneled, but before any evidence was 
presented to the jury, a hearing was conducted in chambers 
on June 21, 1974, concerning juror Carpenter. At this hearing 
(Tr. 124-140), it was disclosed that juror Carpenter has 
discussed the case on two occasions with his son-in-law, 
Bradley Dee, a television reporter with KCPX covering the 
trial. The first dicussion occurred sometime shortly after 
the killing occurred, and the second took place on the evening 
of June 20, 1974, after the jury had been impaneled. Based 
on these discussions, a mistrial was requested, which was 
denied by the court. (Tr. 143-148). 
Evidence was introduced and received over the con-
tinuing objection of counsel as to other crimes allegedly 
committed by appellant, in particular an armed robbery which 
occurred on December 28, 1973. Five witnesses testified in 
regards to the alleged robery: Sheryl Cheever, the victim 
of the robbery (Tr. 182-207); Deloy Kimball White, a police 
officer investigating the robbery (Tr. 259-264); Willard 
Craigen, another investigating police officer (Tr. 282-294, 
299, 312-313); Phil K. Bodily, a police officer who arrested 
appellant for the armed robery (Tr. 323); and Patricia Ann 
Ratley, an admitted accomplice in the robbery (Tr. 445-456). 
The evidence of other crimes was extensive, and included 
identification in court, and the introduction and admission 
into evidence of photographs of appellant previously identified 
as the suspect. All objections to the receipt of such 
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testimony and evidence were denied by the court. 
Numerous objections and motions were made as to 
the evidence presented on behalf of defendant, which were 
denied as is documented in Point III of this brief. These 
rulings are discussed in terms of their cumulative effect. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT BELOW COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL ON THE BASIS OF 
JURY MISCONDUCT. 
The leading case concerning the question of a 
stranger's communication with a juror in a criminal case 
i s Remitter v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 347 U . S . 227 ( 1 9 5 4 ) , i n which 
the court vacated a judgment of guilty for wilful evasion of 
payment of federal income taxes. The record presented to 
the court did not disclose whether the outside contact was 
harmful or harmless, but the court stressed that the integrity 
of jury proceedings must not be jeopordized by any unauthorized 
invasions. 
"In a criminal case, any private communication, 
contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, 
with a juror during a trial about the matter 
pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, 
deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made 
in pursuance of known rules of the court and 
the instructions and directions the court made 
during the trial, with full knowledge of the 
parties. The presumption is not conclusive, 
but the burden rests heavily upon the Government 
to establish, after notice to and hearing of the 
defendant, that such contact with the juror was 
harmless to the defendant. Mattox v. United 
States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-150, 36 L.Ed. 917, 920, 
921, 13 S. Ct. 50; Wheaton v. United States 
(CA 8th SD), 133 F.2d 522, 527. Id, at 229." 
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Although a standard for overcoming the burden has 
not been delineated, one decision found that a juror informing 
the court of the communication, and stating that he could 
decide the case as if the incident had not occurred was not 
sufficient, Stone v. United States, 113 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 
1940) . The court recognized, in rejecting the jurors assertion 
that he could weigh the facts fairly, that jurors are human and 
not always conscious to what extent they are in fact biased 
or prejudiced and their inward sentiments cannot always 
be ascertained. 
"The question is, not whether any actual wrong 
resulted from the conversation. . .with the 
juror. . .but whether it created a condition 
from which prejudice might arise or from which 
the general public would suspect that the jury 
might be influenced to reach a verdict on the 
ground of bias or prejudice. When the judgment 
is weak, prejudice is strong, and it is essential 
to faith in the jury system that jurors shall 
determine the facts submitted to them wholly 
on the evidence offered in open court, unbiased 
and uninfluenced by anything they may have seen 
or heard outside of the actual trial of the case. 
Id, at 77." 
This decision was followed in United States v. 
Ferguson, 486 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1973), in which the juror 
was removed, but not until after he had discussed the case 
with other members of the jury. Although the remaining 
juror assured the court that he still had an open mind on 
the case, it was held that the presumption of prejudice was 
not overcome. 
"The burden was on the Government to show that 
no prejudice resulted from the communication. 
Our insistence on this high standard was 
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necessary, not only to insure that the defendant 
received a fair trial by impartial jurors, but 
also to maintain the integrity of the jury system. 
Id, at 971." 
One other case is pertinent to the issues presented. 
In People v. Thomas, 120 Cal. Rptr. 637, 47 Cal. App. 3d 
178 (1975) four jurors disclosed that they had read a news-
paper story concerning the case, but each stated that he 
was not influenced. The court, placing special emphasis 
on the fact that the jury had been impaneled but that no 
testimony had yet been received when the disclosure was made, 
held it to be an abuse of discretion to deny a motion for 
mistrial. 
Turning to the facts of the instant case, the record 
discloses that the jury, after being impaneled, was expressly 
instructed by the court "that it is your duty not to converse 
with nor allow yourselves to be addressed by anyone or any 
subject of the trial." (Tr. 123 In. 27-30). Subsequently, 
but before any evidence was presented, it was disclosed that 
juror Carpenter discussed the case on two occasions with his 
son-in-law, a television reporter covering the case. The 
first discussion occurred several months before the trial, 
but juror Carpenter did not disclose this information to 
the court during the jury selection process in response to 
direct questioning by Judge Swan as to prior knowledge of 
the case. (Tr. 41-48). The second discussion occurred after 
the court's instruction not to discuss the case, which was 
disclosed to the court only after it was brought to its 
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attention by Bradley Deef the son-in-law who conversed with 
juror Carpenter about the case, at the hearing. (Tr. 124-140). 
The State prosecutor, in attempting to meet its burden of 
showing the contact to be harmless, elicited the opinion of 
juror Carpenter that he could be an impartial juror and give 
the defendant a fair trial (Tr. 130-135). However, juror 
Carpenter also stated that, if in the hypothetical that he 
and the defendant were to switch positions, he would "probably 
not" want a jury sitting which knew what he knew, and discussed 
what he had discussed. (Tr. 130 In. 7-21). Bradley Dee who 
testified at the hearing, disclosed that in the discussions 
with juror Carpenter he related information from police reports 
on the case, and that his opinion was liased in favor of the 
police, that the defendant would be guilty. (Tr. 138-140). 
Juror Carpenter confirmed that Bradley Dee thought the defendant 
to be guilty. (Tr. 127-128). 
Appellant submits that the State had the burden to 
show that the communication with juror Carpenter was harmless, 
and in no event prejudicial. This burden was not satisfied 
by the mere assertion by the juror that he would not let the 
discussions influence his deliberation of the verdict, especially 
in view of the circumstances presented. It is also significant 
to note the point of the proceedings at which the irregularity 
was discovered. The jury had been impaneled, but no evidence 
had been presented, and there was an alternate juror sitting 
on the case. Under these additional circumstances, appellant 
submits that it was both error and an abuse of discretion not 
to discharge juror Carpenter. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT BELOW COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT ALLOWED EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES TO BE ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE. 
In reviewing the transcript (see Statement of Facts 
for page citations), five witnesses testified as to an armed 
robbery allegedly committed by appellant. Photographic 
evidence (Exhibits M and N) was introduced and received. It 
would be fair to say that the prosecution, in trying appellant 
for homicide, presented a prima facie case for a crime of 
which appellant was not properly before the court. The amount 
of evidence presented seems to indicate that the prosecution 
was trying to prove appellant guilty of armed robbery beyond 
a reasonable doubt, rather than to introduce evidence of 
other crimes for an admissible purpose. 
The rule in Utah as to when evidence of crimes 
other than the one at trial are admissible is well summarized 
in State v. Lopez, 22 U.2d 257, 451 P.2d 775 (1969). This 
Court ruled in that case as follows: 
"[E]vidence of other crimes is not admissible 
if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant as 
a person of evil character with a propensity to 
commit crime and thus likely to have committed 
the crime charged. However, if the evidence 
has relevancy to explain the circumstances 
surrounding the instant crime, it is admissible 
for that purpose, and the fact that it may tend 
to connect the defendant with another crime will 
not render it incompetent. Such harm as there 
may be in receiving evidence concerning another 
crime is to be weighed against the necessity of 
full inquiry into the facts relating to the 
issues. Id, at 775." 
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The evidence introduced in the instant case falls 
within the general rule of State v. Lopez, as it was unnecessary 
to explain the surrounding circumstances of the crime charged, 
nor was it relevant to the issues of the charge. Thus the 
purpose of introducing such evidence could only have a purpose 
to disgrace appellant and make him look like a man of evil 
character likely to commit the crime charged. Alternatively, 
even if this Court should find some relevance to the evidence 
of other crimes, the degree and extent to which the prosecution 
placed upon such evidence was so great as to unduly prejudice 
appellant. The substantial prejudice of such extensive 
introduction of evidence, when taken together, creates a 
situation where it cannot be said with any degree of assurance 
that there would not have been a different result in the 
verdict by the absence of such evidence. 
Additional Utah case law demonstrates the inappro-
priateness of the introduction of evidence going to other 
crimes (or alternatively to the degree of such introduction). 
In State v. Kazda, 14 U.2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963), this 
Court in noting the extent of testimony regarding crimes 
not proven against that defendant, ruled such introduction, 
to be prejudicial despite an admonition to the jury to disregard 
offenses related in the testimony. In State v. Dickson, 
12 U.2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961), questions were asked going 
into detail regarding another crime for which that defendant 
had not been tried. This Court, in reversing the conviction 
and granting a new trial, rejected justification for introducing 
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such evidence under a modus operanti theory or for impeachment 
purposes. In State v. Peterson, 23 U.2d 58 457 P.2d 532 
(1969) , that defendant was charged with selling an illegal 
drug. This Court held it to be prejudicial for the prosecution 
to interrogate him as to his use of other narcotics, and that 
such an error could be corrected only by remanding the case 
for a new trial. In State v. Gillan, 23 U.2d 372, 463 P.2d 
811 (1970) , this Court reversed a conviction where evidence 
was introduced to show a prior threatening incident made by 
the defendant to a person other than the victim. This Court 
stated that evidence of other crimes must have a special 
relevancy in proving the crime charged, rather than a tendency 
for a particular characteristic. 
Other Utah case law is adverse to appellant, but 
can be distinguished for similar reasons; see State v. Baran, 
25 U.2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970), State v. Johnson, 25 U.2d 
160, 478 P.2d 491 (1970), and 01sen v. Swapp, 535 P.2d 1232 
(Ut. 1975) . In each of these cases, the evidence of other 
crimes were similar in nature to the crime charged. Indi-
vidually, one case allowed evidence as to similar crimes 
committed on the same evening (Baran), and another involved 
evidence of a similar crime where the subject was introduced 
into trial by the defendant (Olsen). In the present case, 
the crime charged is criminal homicide, which is not a 
similar crime to robbery, nor was the alleged robbery 
committed proximately close to the commission of the offense 
charged, nor was it introduced into evidence by the appellant. 
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Therefore, it is submitted that these cases are not in point, 
and that resolution of this case is better established under 
the principles of State v. Kazda, supra. 
While this Court has stated on occasion that evidence 
of other crimes may be admissible to show motive, it has not 
had an opportunity to delineate as to what a proper case would 
be for such an admission, and what the limits on the intro-
duction of other crime evidence would be. Recent case law 
in other jurisdictions on this narrow subject is abundant, 
and appellant would submit the principles of two representative 
cases for guidance. In United States v. demons, 503 F.2d 
486 (8th Cir. 1974), the following guidelines were enunciated 
as to evidence of other crimes. 
"Before any such evidence is admitted, however, 
it must be shown that (1) an issue on which 
other crime evidence may be received is raised; 
(2) that the proffered evidence is relevant to 
that issue; (3) that the evidence is clear and 
convincing; and (4) that the probative worth 
outweighs the probable prejudicial impact." 
In that case considerable time at trial was devoted 
to the "other crime," and photographs were introduced in 
support of such evidence. The attention given to this 
evidence was held to be prejudicial and the case was reversed 
and remanded. In United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 10 01 (6th 
Cir. 1975), the court noted that even where other crimes 
evidence has substantial independent relevancy, it should be 
excluded when its probative value for the purpose offered is 
outweighed by the danger that it will stir such passion in 
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the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration of 
guilt of innocence of the crime on trial. The court noted 
that evidence of prior bad acts may not be introduced unnecessarily 
as a pretext for placing highly prejudicial evidence of bad 
character before the jury, and that the mere recitation by 
the prosecution that evidence of bad acts is offered under 
an exception is not sufficient for its admission. Accordingly, 
the conviction was reversed and remanded. 
Turning again to the facts and circumstances of 
the instant case in view of the cited authority, the probative 
worth of the other crimes evidence did not outweigh the 
prejudicial impact. This is especially true when examining 
the degree to which such evidence was stressed to the jury. 
Such degree was unnecessary, and can only be regarded as a 
pretext for placing bad character before the jury. While 
the prosecution claimed the other crime evidence to be 
admissible for showing motive, a justification not conceded 
by appellant in this case, the prosecution did not elaborate 
beyond the mere recitation of the justification, and then 
proceded to present voluminous evidence going to the prior 
robbery. Thus, even if the evidence would have been justified 
for admission, said justification was lost when the prejudicial 
impact was compounded by extensive and unnecessary detail. 
POINT III 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE COURT'S RULINGS ON 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
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The following is an index of objections and motions 
made by defense counsel which were overruled by the trial 
court: 
Transcript 
Page 
143-145 
150-151 
152 
153 
153 
157 
184-188 
212-213 
216 
233-235 
238 
259 
260 
264-313 
280 
283 
284-287 
Description 
Motion for Mistrial on Basis of Jury Misconduct 
(Denied at 147-148) 
Objection to Relevency of Continuing Line of 
Questioning 
Objection to Question as leading 
Objection to Statement as Conclusory 
Hearsay Objection 
Hearsay Objection 
Objection to Evidence of other Crimes as 
Admissible 
Four Objections to Questions Leading *or 
repetitious 
Objection to Question as Leading 
Motion for Mistrial on Basis of Information 
not Released by Police 
Hearsay Objection 
Continuing Objection to Evidence of other 
Crimes 
Hearsay Objection 
Objection to Admission of Photographs into 
Evidence 
Objection to Opinion or Speculative 
Hearsay Objection 
Motion for Mistrial on Basis of Evidence of 
Other Crimes 
291 Hearsay Objection 
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292-294 Three Motions to Strike 
293 Objection to Question as Leading 
329 Objection to Statement as Conclusory 
345-346 Objection to Question as assuming fact not 
in Evidence 
367 Objection to Question as Calling for Speculative 
Opinion 
416 Objection to Use of Document 
423 Objection to Question as Speculative 
447-448 Hersay Objection 
453 Relevancy Objection 
457 Hearsay Objection 
459 Objection to Question as Leading 
461 Objection to Question 
471 Objection to Question as Leading 
472 Hearsay Objection 
484 Objection to Question 
489 Relevancy Objection 
567 Foundation Objection 
572 Probativeness Objection 
587 Foundation Objection 
618 Objection to Condition Resting at Case by 
Prosecution 
622-649 Six Motions Made and Argued 
650 Objection to Reopening of Case by Prosecution 
668-675 Four Objections to Witness Reading Document 
681, 692 Foundation Objection 
690-691 Two Objections to Questions as Improper Redirect 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
704 Hearsay Objection 
705 Objection to Question as Leading 
725 Motions Made and Argued at 622-649 Renewed 
744 Objection to Question 
869-870 Objection to Admission of Gun into Evidence 
873-877 Renewed Motions plus Additional Motions Made 
and Argued 
878-879 Exceptions to Jury Instructions 
879-882 Objection to Requested Jury Instructions Not 
Given 
The objections and motions which were denied 
incorporate issues argued in Points I and II, as well as 
others. Appellant submits that the comulative effect of 
these rulings requires that he be granted a new trial. 
The leading case in Utah concerning the 
cumulative effect of the ruling upon the evidence is State 
v
- St. Clair, 3 U.2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955), in which the 
defendant, convicted of murder, was granted a new trial. 
This Court recognized the validity, upon appellate review, 
to consider the cumulative effects of the trial court's 
evidentiary rulings. 
"None of the rulings on evidence, considered 
singly, may seem of any great import. But the 
defendant is nevertheless entitled to have them 
considered cumulatively and as part of the over-
all picture in determining whether he had a fair 
opportunity to present his defense. Id, at 328." 
This Court went on to hold that not only could the 
ruling on evidence be considered cumulatively, but that the 
cumulative effect could be such as to require a new trial, 
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and cited prior decisions of the Court consistent with that 
position. 
"The proposition for us to decide here is not 
whether any of the irregularities herein dis-
cussed would separately have been such as to 
constitute prejudicial error and require a new 
trial. It is recognized that a combination of 
errors which, when singly considered might be 
thought insufficient to warrant a reversal, 
might in their cumulative effect do so. State 
v. Vasquez, 101 U. 444, 121 P.2d 903, 140 A.L.R. 
755 (1942); see State v. Moore, 111 U. 458, 
183 P.2d 973 (1947). Id, at 332 (Footnote 
added)." 
In that case this Court found sufficient evidence 
to support a conviction, but nevertheless granted a new 
trial, in part because of uncertainty as to whether the 
degree of the crime found in the verdict was tainted by the 
cumulative effects of the trial court's rulings on the 
evidence. 
"Under such circumstances, we cannot affirm 
with confidence that the result would have been 
the same in the absence of the irregularities 
mentioned. We are, therefore, impelled to the 
conclusion that there is substantial doubt that 
the defendant was properly convicted, which 
doubt should be resolved in his favor, so that 
we are conscientiously bound to grant a new 
trial. Id. at 332." 
Appellant submits that the present case is squarely 
within the St. Clair decision. 
The adverse rulings to appellant were many, but 
the major ones should be reiterated. First as argued in 
Point I, was the retention of Juror Carpenter to sit on the 
jury despite his misconduct in violation of the court's 
admonition. Second, as argued in Point II, was the evidence 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
admitted as to other crimes allegedly committed by appellant. 
Again, the degree to which such evidence was introduced is 
the subject for complaint. The testimony of the eyewitness-
victim to the robbery, the police testimony, and the two 
photographs introduced in evidence went far beyond whatever 
legitimate purpose for such testimony and evidence. The 
revelation during the course of trial that information was 
not released by police to defense counsel of a potentially 
exculpatory character. The motions argued near the con-
clusion of trial to dismiss the more serious charges 
against appellant. The exceptions and objections to the 
jury instructions. All of these points, plus the others 
documented in the index demonstrate the cumulative effect 
upon the fairness of appellant's conviction. It cannot be 
said with confidence that the trial result would have been 
the same had not the irregularities occurred; it can be 
said that there is substantial doubt whether appellant was 
properly convicted. For all these reasons, this Court 
should grant appellant a new trial, under the controlling 
mandate of State v. St. Clair, Supra. 
CONCLUSION 
As argued, the misconduct of juror Carpenter 
necessitated his discharge from the trying of the case. The 
failure to exclude this juror, and/or to declare a mistrial, 
was error. 
The admission into evidence of other crime 
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evidence, because of the degree of such admission and its 
character, was error. The prejudicial import of such 
evidence outweighed its probative worth. 
Even if the conviction is not reversible under 
the two specific contentions, the trial court made numerous 
rulings on the evidence presented, which in their comulative 
effect substantially prejudiced the appellant, whether or 
not the individual rulings were sufficient error. For each 
and all of these reasons, appellant prays that the conviction 
be reversed and the matter be remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. Gilbert Athay 
Attorney for Appellant 
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